دانلود کتاب Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology.

Biotechnology in the age of synthetic biology expands the landscape of potential defense concerns. The
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its partnering agencies should continue to pursue ongoing strategies
for chemical and biological defense; these strategies remain relevant in the age of synthetic biology. DoD
and its partners also need to have approaches to account for the broader capabilities enabled by synthetic
biology, now and into the future.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING CONCERN CONTRIBUTES TO PLANNING
Recommendation
The Department of Defense and its interagency partners should use a framework in assessing synthetic
biology capabilities and their implications.
(a) A framework is a valuable tool for parsing the changing biotechnology landscape.
(b) Using a framework facilitates the identification of bottlenecks and barriers, as well as efforts to
monitor advances in technology and knowledge that change what is possible.
(c) A framework provides a mechanism for incorporating the necessary technical expertise into the
assessment. A framework enables the participation of technical experts in synthetic biology and biotechnology
along with experts in complementary areas (e.g., intelligence and public health).

SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY EXPANDS WHAT IS POSSIBLE
Synthetic biology expands what is possible in creating new weapons. It also expands the range of actors
who could undertake such efforts and decreases the time required. Based on this study’s analysis of the potential
ways in which synthetic biology approaches and tools may be misused to cause harm, the following specific
observations were made:
(a) Of the potential capabilities assessed, three currently warrant the most concern: (1) re-creating
known pathogenic viruses, (2) making existing bacteria more dangerous, and (3) making harmful
biochemicals via in situ synthesis. The first two capabilities are of high concern due to usability of the
FIGURE S-1 Framework for assessing concern. The framework consists of four factors, along with descriptive elements
within each factor. The factors are Usability of the Technology, Usability as a Weapon, Requirements of Actors, and Potential
for Mitigation. These factors delineate the information used to assess the level of concern for particular synthetic biology–
enabled capabilities.
Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
4 BIODEFENSE IN THE AGE OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
technology. The third capability, which involves using microbes to produce harmful biochemicals in
humans, is of high concern because its novelty challenges potential mitigation options.
(b) With regard to pathogens, synthetic biology is expected to (1) expand the range of what could be
produced, including making bacteria and viruses more harmful; (2) decrease the amount of time
required to engineer such organisms; and (3) expand the range of actors who could undertake such
efforts. The creation and manipulation of pathogens is facilitated by increasingly accessible technologies
and starting materials, including DNA sequences in public databases. A wide range of pathogen characteristics
could be explored as part of such efforts.
(c) With regard to chemicals, biochemicals, and toxins, synthetic biology blurs the line between chemical
and biological weapons. High-potency molecules that can be produced through simple genetic
pathways are of greatest concern, because they could conceivably be developed with modest resources
and organizational footprint.
(d) It may be possible to use synthetic biology to modulate human physiology in novel ways. These
ways include physiological changes that differ from the typical effects of known pathogens and chemical
agents. Synthetic biology expands the landscape by potentially allowing the delivery of biochemicals
by a biological agent and by potentially allowing the engineering of the microbiome or immune system.
Although unlikely today, these types of manipulations may become more feasible as knowledge of complex
systems, such as the immune system and microbiome, grows.
(e) Some malicious applications of synthetic biology may not seem plausible now but could become
achievable if certain barriers are overcome. These barriers include knowledge barriers, as is the case
for building a novel pathogen, or technological barriers, as in engineering complex biosynthetic pathways
into bacteria or re-creating known bacterial pathogens. It is important to continue to monitor advances in
biotechnology that may lower these barriers.